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1. INTRODUCTION
We are interested in mechanisms that maximize the final
social welfare. In [1] this problem was studied for multi-
unit auctions with unit demand bidders and for the public
project problem, and in each case social welfare undomi-
nated mechanisms in the class of feasible and incentive com-
patible mechanisms were identified.
One way to improve upon these optimality results is by
relaxing the assumption of simultaneity and allowing the
players to move sequentially. With this in mind, we study
here sequential versions of two feasible Groves mechanisms
used for single item auctions: the Vickrey auction and the
Bailey-Cavallo mechanism.
Because of the absence of dominant strategies in this se-
quential setting, we focus on a weaker concept of an optimal
strategy. For each mechanism, we introduce natural optimal
strategies and observe that in each mechanism these strate-
gies exhibit different behaviour. However, we then show that
among all optimal strategies, the one we introduce for each
mechanism maximizes the social welfare when each player
follows it. The resulting social welfare can be larger than
the one obtained in the simultaneous setting.
2. PRELIMINARIES
Assume that there is a finite set of possible outcomes or
decisions D, a set {1, . . ., n} of players where n ≥ 2, and
for each player i a set of types Θi and an (initial) utility
function vi. A decision rule is a function f : Θ→D,
where Θ := Θ1 × · · · ×Θn.
A mechanism is given by a pair of functions (f, t), where
f is the decision rule and t = (t1, ..., tn) is the tax function
that determines the players’ payments. We assume that the
(final) utility function for player i is a function ui defined
by ui(d, t1, . . ., tn, θi) := vi(d, θi) + ti.
We focus on two special Groves mechanisms (for details on
Groves mechanisms see [5]). The first one is the well known
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pivotal mechanism1. The Vickrey auction is simply the
pivotal mechanism for a single item auction. The second is
the Bailey-Cavallo mechanism, in short BC auction . It
was originally proposed in [3, 4], where it was also demon-
strated that it can be a more appropriate mechanism when
one is interested in maximizing the final social welfare.
3. SEQUENTIAL MECHANISMS
We are interested in sequential mechanisms, in which the
players announce their types sequentially. In this section we
review the relevant concepts, some of which were introduced
in [2]. Without loss of generality, we assume the order to be
1, . . ., n. Hence each player i knows the types announced by
players 1, . . ., i − 1, and can use this information to decide
which type to announce.
A strategy of player i in a sequential mechanism is a
function
si : Θ1 × . . .×Θi →Θi.
If the vector of types that the players receive is θ and the
vector of strategies that they follow is s(·) := (s1(·), . . ., sn(·)),
the vector of the announced types will be denoted by [s(·), θ],
where [s(·), θ] is defined inductively by [s(·), θ]1 := s1(θ1)
and [s(·), θ]i+1 := si+1([s(·), θ]1, . . ., [s(·), θ]i, θi+1).
A strategy si(·) of player i is dominant in the sequential
version of the mechanism (f, t) if there is no incentive for
player i to deviate to another strategy no matter what the
other players announce.
A weaker notion is that of an optimal strategy. We say
that strategy si(·) of player i is optimal if for all θ ∈ Θ and
all θ′i ∈ Θi
ui((f, t)(si(θ1, . . ., θi), θ−i), θi) ≥ ui((f, t)(θ′i, θ−i), θi).
Call a strategy of player j myopic if it does not depend
on the types of players 1, . . ., j − 1. Then a strategy si(·) is
optimal if for all θ ∈ Θ it yields a best response to all joint
strategies of players j = i in which the strategies of players
i+1, . . ., n are myopic. In particular, an optimal strategy is
a best response to the truth-telling by players j = i. Each
dominant strategy is optimal. For player n the concepts of
dominant and optimal strategies coincide.
There are two natural ways of maximizing players’ utili-
tities. The first one calls for a simultaneous maximization
of other players’ utilities. That is, we say that strategy si(·)
1This is sometimes referred to as the VCG mechanism.
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of player i is socially maximal if it is optimal and for all
optimal strategies s′i(·) of player i, all θ ∈ Θ and all j = i
uj((f, t)(si(θ1, . . ., θi), θ−i), θj) ≥
uj((f, t)(s
′
i(θ1, . . ., θi), θ−i), θj).
So a socially maximal strategy of player i simultaneously
guarantees the maximal utility to every other player, under
the assumption that players i+1, . . ., n use myopic strategies.
The second option is to maximize the social welfare. We
say that strategy si(·) is socially optimal if it is optimal
and for all optimal strategies s′i(·) of player i and all θ ∈ ΘPn
j=1 uj((f, t)(si(θ1, . . ., θi), θ−i), θj) ≥Pn
j=1 uj((f, t)(s
′
i(θ1, . . ., θi), θ−i), θj).
Hence a socially optimal strategy of player i yields the
maximal social welfare among all optimal strategies, under
the assumption that players i+1, . . ., n use myopic strategies.
Note that each socially maximal strategy is socially optimal.
The converse does not hold.
For a mechanism where each player i receives a type θi ∈
Θi and follows a strategy si(·), we denote the resulting so-
cial welfare by SW (θ, s(·)). We are interested in finding a
sequence of optimal players’ strategies for which the result-
ing social welfare is always maximal.
3.1 Sequential Vickrey auctions
In this and the next Section all proofs are omitted. First,
we have the following negative result.
Theorem 3.1. Consider a sequential Vickrey auction. For
i ∈ {1, . . ., n− 1} no dominant strategy exists for player i.
So we shall focus on the weaker notion of optimal strategy.
The following natural strategy for player i is an example of
an optimal strategy that deviates from truth-telling:
si(θ1, . . ., θi) :=
j
θi if θi > maxj∈{1,...,i−1} θj ,
0 otherwise.
(1)
When we limit our attention to optimal strategies we get
the following result.
Theorem 3.2. Consider a sequential Vickrey auction. For
all θ ∈ Θ, all vectors s(·) of optimal players’ strategies and
all optimal strategies s′i(·) of player i
ui((f, t)([s(·), θ], θi) = ui((f, t)([(s′i(·), s−i(·)), θ], θi).
This can be interpreted as a statement that each optimal
strategy is dominant within the universe of optimal strate-
gies. However, optimal strategies may differ when the play-
ers take into account the utility of other players, in particu-
lar, the social welfare.
The following result shows that strategy si(·) defined in
(1) plays a special role.
Theorem 3.3. In the sequential Vickrey auction strategy
si(·) defined in (1) is socially maximal for player i.
Finally, when each player i follows strategy si(·) of Theo-
rem 3.3, maximal social welfare is generated.
Theorem 3.4. In the sequential Vickrey auction for all
θ ∈ Θ and vectors s′(·) of optimal players’ strategies,
SW (θ, s(·)) ≥ SW (θ, s′(·))
where s(·) is the vector of strategies si(·) defined in (1).
This maximal final social welfare under s(·) is always greater
than or equal to the social welfare achieved in a Vickrey
auction when players bid truthfully. Additionally, for some
inputs, it is strictly greater.
3.2 Sequential BC auctions
We can show that in analogy to sequential Vickrey auc-
tions no dominant strategies exist except for the last player.
In fact we can establish this for a wide class of Groves auc-
tions. Details will appear in the full version of this work.
We shall thus focus, as in the case of sequential Vickrey
auctions, on the weaker notion of optimal strategy. We have
various natural optimal strategies that deviate from truth-
telling, such as the following one:
si(θ1, . . . , θi) :=
8><
>:
θi if θi > maxj∈{1,...,i−1} θj
(θ1, . . . , θi−1)
∗
1 if θi ≤ maxj∈{1,...,i−1} θj
and i ≤ n− 1
(θ1, . . . , θi−1)
∗
2 otherwise
(2)
In contrast to the Vickrey auction, the analogue of The-
orem 3.2 does not hold for the sequential BC auctions. In
particular this means that optimal strategies are not domi-
nant within the universe of optimal strategies.
We now turn to the question of existence of socially opti-
mal strategies, which we answer negatively. This is again in
contrast to the sequential Vickrey auction.
Theorem 3.5. The sequential BC auction does not admit
socially optimal strategies except for the first and last player.
The results established so far show that the sequential
Vickrey auctions and BC auctions differ in many ways. We
conclude by showing that they do share one property. Namely,
within the universe of optimal strategies there exists an op-
timal strategy si(·) such that if all players follow it, then
maximal social welfare is generated for all θ ∈ Θ.
Theorem 3.6. In the sequential BC auction for all θ ∈ Θ
and all vectors s′(·) of optimal players’ strategies,
SW (θ, s(·)) ≥ SW (θ, s′(·))
where s(·) is the vector of strategies si(·) defined in (2).
This maximal final social welfare is always greater than
or equal to the final social welfare achieved in a BC auction
when players bid truthfully. Additionally, for some inputs,
it is strictly greater.
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